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I. Introduction
Controlling shareholders have additional motives to hold shares in the company
compared to minority shareholders, as they are able to extract private benefits such
as social status, public prestige, or discretionary power to divert cash flows or to pay
excessive compensation to blockholders or their relatives.
Private benefits of control, then, can be an important driver in the controlling
shareholders’ choice about the size of the initial ownership share, and about their
subsequent trading decisions. Since the controlling shareholders’ trading decisions
affect the formation of investors’ beliefs and the amount of shares floating on the
market, private benefits may have significant impact on stock prices.
In this paper, I present and estimate a dynamic model of optimal shareholding to
quantify the private benefits of controlling shareholders and to measure the impact
of private benefits of control on shares price.
In the model, a large shareholder and a mass of marginal investors hold shares in
a company. The marginal investors are uninformed about the fundamental value of
the firm, and they trade on their heterogenous expectations, which they revise over
time using two pieces of information: the shocks to the fundamental value of the
firm and the trading decision of the large shareholder, who has perfect information
over the true value of the firm. However, the large shareholder also extracts private
benefits from the stake, so that the information released by his trading is noisy.
The large shareholder trades off stock mispricing and private benefits against risk
diversification and price impact of the trade, where the amount of private benefits
extracted from the stake depends on the attainment of given thresholds of stake (for
instance, 50% for the control of the firm). This assumption is in line with the insti-
tutional framework, according to which shareholders’ rights and obligations arise as
soon as shareholders get hold of a given percentage of the outstanding shares.
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In the absence of private benefits, the large shareholder always trades on the mis-
pricing of the marginal investors. However, the mispricing reduces over time as the
marginal investors learn from the large shareholder’s trades. Thus, it becomes less
profitable for the latter to exploit the mispricing. With additional private benefits,
instead, the large shareholder may not trade at all. The reason is that the large
shareholder sells a block of shares only when the share is largely overvalued, so that
the gains offset both the loss in private benefits and shares depreciation, given the
negative price impact of the trade. Specular reasoning applies to the purchase of an
additional block of shares.
The price impact of private benefits is two-fold. First, private benefits affect the
decision of the large shareholder in terms of size of the stake, and so the number of
shares tradable on the market. Second, when the controlling shareholder extracts
private benefits from the ownership share, his trading decisions are less affected by
the fundamental value of the firm, and so they are less informative about the true
value of the firm. Therefore, the presence of private benefits makes it more noisy for
the rest of the investors to extract information from the large shareholder’s trade.
To estimate the model, I use data on Italian public companies for which large
shareholders are required to disclose their stakes every six months, thus allowing for
data with higher frequency with respect to previous studies on the ownership dynam-
ics (e.g., Donelli, Larrain, and Urzsua (2013)).1 The data show that large shareholders
trade infrequently, despite substantial variation in the economic fundamentals of the
firm, stock prices, and trading volumes. Moreover, when they trade, large sharehold-
ers buy or sell large blocks of shares, while they trade small stakes very rarely.
The main estimation results are the following. First, I estimate private benefits of
control of around 2% of equity value. Moreover, I show that the distribution of private
1In comparison, US disclosure rules allow to have information only on purchases of blocks above
5% of the outstanding shares (file 13D or 13G), and on the portfolio of big institutional investors with
more than 100 millions of dollars of equity assets under management (file 13F).
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benefits is highly positively skewed: 50% of the large shareholders extract private
benefits of less than 1% of equity value, and the maximum rate is 20%.
Second, I show that private benefits of control generally have positive impact on
stock prices. This result implies that large shareholders extract private benefits
without cost for the rest of the company shareholders. As for the private benefits,
the price impact is very heterogenous across firms. For 15% of firms, in fact, private
benefits have a negative impact greater than 1%, and for the same proportion of firms
the private benefits have a positive impact larger than 5%. Moreover, I find evidence
of a synergistic effect. When the controlling shareholder is a corporation, the positive
price impact of the large shareholder’s stake is even larger compared to the case of
individual large shareholders.
Third, I document that the presence of large shareholders has, overall, a substan-
tial positive impact on stock prices. This positive price impact is large during the
European sovereign debt crisis of 2011-2012, so that large shareholders may be par-
ticularly beneficial to the rest of the investors during negative economic cycles.
Finally, I estimate the certainty equivalent payoff of the large shareholders’ stakes
over time, which is unobservable when the large shareholder does not trade. I show
that private benefits contribute to compensate large shareholders for holding very
undiversified portfolios, thus keeping the stake valuation of the large shareholders
always above the market price of the stock.
My paper relates to both theoretical and empirical studies on private benefits of
control and controlling shareholders’ ownership policy. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the first paper to provide a measure of the impact of large shareholders on stock
prices over time, only predicted in theory by the dynamic models of Collin-Dufresne
and Fos (2015) and DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006), and estimated at the time of the
block trade by Albuquerque and Schroth (2010).
Theoretical papers predict that the heterogenous valuation between large and
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small shareholders should always trigger trading by the large shareholder (e.g., Collin-
Dufresne and Fos (2015), and DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006)). The framework closer
to the one presented here is the model of DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006), where a
large shareholder that manages and monitors a firm is prevented to trade to his op-
timal portfolio allocation from moral hazard, since marginal investors revise the stock
price on the base of the large shareholder’s stake. As a result, the large shareholder
adjusts gradually the stake towards the optimal risk-sharing allocation, where the
speed of adjustment is inversely proportional to the reaction of the investors to the
large shareholder’s trade.
The implication of persistent trading by the large shareholder is contradicted by
empirical evidence showing that the frequency of trading by large shareholders is
much less than expected from the predictions of current models (e.g., Donelli et al.
(2013)). The infrequent trading by the large shareholder, then, emerges as implica-
tion of my model with extraction of private benefits.
Since Bradley (1980), the estimation of the private benefits has captured much
attention in the academic research. Previous studies focus on the acquisition of the
controlling stake to measure private benefits of control (e.g., Barclay and Holderness
(1989), Nicodano and Sembenelli (2004), Dyck and Zingales (2004), and Albuquerque
and Schroth (2010)). First, they show that controlling shareholders are willing to
pay more than the market price to buy the controlling block of shares of a company,
where the difference between the block price and the market price of the shares at
the day of the block negotiation is defined as block premium. Then, they argue that
the premium is justified by the opportunity for the controlling shareholder to extract
private benefits from the controlling stake. Barclay and Holderness (1989), Nicodano
and Sembenelli (2004), and Dyck and Zingales (2004) use the block premium as an
empirical proxy to quantify the private benefits of control, while Albuquerque and
Schroth (2010) perform a structural estimation of private benefits by using an under-
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lying theoretical model of block pricing.
However, if private benefits may impact on the ownership policy of the controlling
shareholder over time, then the ownership policy of the controlling shareholder may
contain crucial information to estimate the private benefits. The intuition is that
private benefits make the large shareholder’s trading less sensitive to changes in the
economic conditions of the firm, since the incentive to hold a given stake may be
mostly due to the opportunity to extract benefits that are unrelated to the economic
fundamentals of the firm. For this reason, I use data on the ownership dynamics of
large shareholders to assess the magnitude of private benefits of control and their
impact on stock prices.
My estimates of private benefits of control are in line with that of (Albuquerque
and Schroth (2010)). Moreover, similarly to Albuquerque and Schroth (2010) and
Nicodano and Sembenelli (2004), I show that the distribution of private benefits is
highly positively skewed. My results show that 50% of the large shareholders (40%
in Albuquerque and Schroth (2010)) extract private benefits less than 1% of equity
value, and the maximum rate of private benefits is 20% (15%).
Even though structural estimation relies on a specific theoretical model, I show
that the estimated model performs well in replicating empirical facts on the dynamics
of large shareholders’ stakes that have not been explicitly targeted.
The paper, then, proceeds with the description of the model assumptions and solu-
tion in the next section. Section 3 describes the estimation methodology, followed by
the estimation results in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
II. The Model
In this section, I describe the model. First, I state the model assumptions, then I
derive the optimality conditions for the marginal investors and the large shareholder.
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Moreover, I derive the equilibrium stock price and large shareholder’s stake. Finally,
I summarize the main results.
A. The Setup
The economy consists of investors with two investment opportunities: the shares
of a company and a riskless asset. The following assumptions describe this economy.
• Assumption 1. Investment Opportunities
The firm is in unit supply and generates cumulative free cash flows described by
the following diffusion
dDt = µtdt+ σDdZt, (1)
dµt = σdXt, (2)
where µt is a time-varying drift, σ and σD are constant, and dZt and dXt are
two independent standard Brownian motions. The firm pays out all cash flows
as dividends. The riskless investment pays a continuously compounded rate of
return r, with perfect elastic supply.
I use this assumption to introduce asymmetric information between marginal
investors and large shareholder, and the sequential learning of the marginal
investors in bayesian fashion, using the observed dividends flow as noisy signal
on µt (see Assumption 3).
• Assumption 2. Investors Population
The economy is populated by a continuum of competitive investors, with meas-
ure M . All the investors are risk-averse, with standard CARA utility function,
defined on the continuous flow of consumption. The agents have equal risk and
intertemporal preferences. The investors live infinitely, and trade continuously
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the riskless asset and the company shares, with price P to be determined in
equilibrium. Let αi,t denote the number of shares owned at time t by the in-
vestor i, with i going from 1 to M. Each investor, then, chooses the amount of





where u(c) = −e−ac, a is the absolute risk-aversion coefficient, and R is the rate
of intertemporal preferences, that is equal to r when a = 0. The wealth of each
investor i is given by the riskless asset and the company shares, that is Wi =
Bi + αiP .
Also, there exists a large shareholder, that is risk-averse, with equal risk and in-
tertemporal preferences as the marginal investors, that lives infinitely, and has
identical objective function as the marginal investors. However, the large share-
holder differs from the rest of the investors in two directions. First, the large
shareholder sets the optimal number of shares at discrete dates τ .2 Moreover,
the large shareholder extracts additional benefits from investing in the firm,
that accrue to the total wealth of the shareholder given by WL = BL + αLP +
Φ(αL). The private benefits from shareholding, Φ(αL), generate continuously an
instantaneous inflow of additional wealth for the large shareholder, denoted by
φ(αL), such that dWL = d(BL+αLP )+φ(αL), according to a discrete step function:
φ(αL) = b ∗ αj,
if αj ≤ αL < αj+1, where αj and αj+1 are given thresholds of stakes (for instance,
0.2 and 0.3, respectively), with j = {0, 1, 2, ..., J − 1}, α0 = 0, and αJ = 1.
I make this assumption for consistency with the actual institutional frame-
2This assumption improves the tractability of the model and follows DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006)
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work, where the shareholders’ rights and obligations are triggered as soon as
the shareholders come into possession of a given percentage of the outstanding
shares. It follows that the shareholders acquire additional rights (or have the
duty to comply with additional obligations) only if they reach the next higher
threshold, and they loose rights (or are free of complying with a given obliga-
tion) as soon as they hold one stock less than a given percentage of shares. The
private benefits take here the form of monetary incomes, or non-pecuniarity
amenities that can be converted in additional wealth.
• Assumption 3. Heterogeneous Information and Beliefs Update
The time-varying drift of the dividends pay out, denoted by µt, is unobservable to
the marginal investors, and observable only to the large shareholder. The mar-
ginal investors have heterogenous prior on µt, conditioning on the information
set at time t, denoted by µi,t, and they have heterogenous prior variances, that
are different conjectures on σ2, denoted by σ2i . The marginal investors receive
two types of signal to update their prior on µt, in a bayesian fashion.
At each time t, the investors observe the continuous cash flow dDt, that is a noisy
signal on µt. The signal is noisy as the investors are not able to disentangle
between the pure shock on the dividend payout, given by σdZt, and the true
dividend drift µt. Therefore, each investor updates continuously her prior on µt
according to the conjecture on σ. In particular, the larger is the investor’s prior
variance σ2i , the lower is the level of confidence of the investor about her prior,
and the larger is the weight assigned to the noisy signal for revising the prior on
µt. The investor’s prior on µt, then, evolves according to the following equation
dµi,t = kiηi,t,







, ηi,t = dDt − Ei,t[dDt],
and Ei,t[dDt] = µi,t.
Therefore, the heterogeneity across investors is fully described by the distribu-
tion of the coefficient ki, that is the weight assigned to the signal for updating
the beliefs on the expected dividend payout. 3
At the discrete dates τ , the investors observe the ownership share of the large
shareholder αL,τ , that is a noisy signal on µt, since investors know that the large
shareholder has additional motives to invest in the firm, given by the private
benefits, that are unobservable to the marginal investors. The update at τ of
each marginal investor about µt is then described by the following equation:
µi,τ = µi,t<τ + gi(τ
−)(αL,τ − αL,τ (µi,t<τ )),
where µi,t<τ is the prior of the investor i before observing the choice of the large
shareholder, αL,τ (µi,t<τ ) is the belief of the investor i about the optimal choice
of the large shareholder, and gi(τ−) is the weight assigned to the observation
of the large shareholder’s choice for updating the prior on µt. Therefore, each
investor i revises upwards (downwards) the conjecture on the true dividend drift
of the firm when the large shareholder sets an ownership share above (below)
the expected choice, that is interpreted as a positive (negative) signal on the true
state of the firm. Following again standard bayesian filtering results, the weight
gi is equal to
3The reader can refer to a set of investors with different level of confidence or information on the
future cash flows generated by a company. An investor with superior level of information, or high
degree of confidence, has a low value of k, and relies little on the signals provided by the actual dividend
payments. Instead, a poorly informed investor is easily conditioned by the fresher information provided















is the derivative of the optimal choice of the large shareholder
with respect to the true dividend drift, and σ2 is the variance of the observation
error, as measure of the noise in the observation with respect to the knowledge
of µt.
In case of no private benefits, the marginal investors know that the large share-
holder sets the demand for shares only on the base of the superior information
on the dividend drift, therefore the observation αL,τ− is clean, that is σ2 = 0,
so gi(τ−) = 1(αµ
L,τ− )
, where αµL,τ− is observable, albeit with one period lag due
to asymmetric information. With private benefits, the observation αL,τ− is not
longer clean, that is σ2 > 0.
Given assumptions 1,2, and 3, the following sections characterize the model solu-
tion. First, I summarize for the reader the main results of the model in figure 1, with
a graphical simulation. Details on the simulation study are provided in the Appendix.
Then, I describe analytically the investors’ optimality and the equilibrium stock price,
the large shareholder’s optimality, finally deriving the model equilibrium. I leave the
proofs for the appendix to save in space and notation.
Without private benefits the large shareholder always trades against the mispri-
cing of the marginal investors, thus gradually converging to the optimal risk-sharing
solution. The marginal investors learn from his trade, therefore they revise their
valuation after observing the large shareholder’s trade.
With private benefits, the large shareholder may not trade at all. Otherwise, the
large shareholder sells (buys) a block of shares when the overvaluation (undervalu-
ation) of the marginal investors make the sale (purchase) convenient to the large
shareholder, taking into account the loss (gain) in private benefits, and the price im-
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Figure 1. Ownership Dynamics, Private Benefits and Mispricing
The figure shows the optimal demand for shares of the large shareholder in presence of
private benefits (blue line), and in absence of private benefits (dotted line), against the dif-
ference between the true dividends drift (µt) and the average belief on the dividends drift
(µ¯t) by the marginal investors before the disclosure of the large shareholder’s stake (dashed
line), after the disclosure of the large shareholder’s stake in absence of private benefits (dia-
mond line), and after the disclosure of the large shareholder’s stake in presence of private
benefits (stars line). The parameters used for the numerical example are the same as for the
simulation study described in the Appendix.
pact of his trade. The signal released by the large shareholder with the demand for
shares, then, is noisy, and generates a distortion in the update of the marginal in-
vestors about the expected dividend payout of the company, that is also the reason
why the weight assigned to the choice of the large shareholder is lower with respect
to the case of no private benefits (Figure 2, left panel).
B. Equilibrium Share Price and Investor’s Optimality
At each time t, the optimal choice in terms of number of shares of the investor i is
given by:
αi,t =




Figure 2. The impact of LS ownership policy
The left panel shows the average updating weight assigned to the observation of the large
shareholder’s stake by the marginal investors to update their belief on the dividends drift,
with (blue line) and without (red dotted line) private benefits. The right panel shows the
equilibrium stock price at the disclosure dates τ with (blue line) and without (red dotted line)
private benefits. The parameters used for the numerical example are the same as for the
simulation study described in the Appendix.
where µ¯t is the average expected dividend by the marginal investors, and the risk
premium ρ, determined by market clearing condition, that is
∫
i
αi,tdi = 1 − αL,t for
each t, is
ρt = (1− αL,t)aIrσ2,










 Proof. Appendix A
Equation (3) has a natural interpretation. While the demand for shares decreases
with the dividends process variance and the risk aversion coefficient, the demand
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increases with the difference between the individual and the average belief about
the expected dividend payout of the firm. Equation (3) reminds the familiar optimal
risky asset allocation for a mean-variance investor, and it is equivalent to the optimal
solution of the small price-taker investor of DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006). However,
in DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006) the risk premium only depends on the large share-
holder’s trading, as the expected dividend payout is observable.




e−r(s−t)(µ¯s − ρs)ds, (4)
 Proof. Appendix A
Hence, the share price is the present value of the expected future dividend pay-
ments by the marginal investors, minus the risk premium component. The former
evolves continuously according to the following equation
dµ¯t = k¯t(dDt − µ¯t), (5)
that is the average belief increases (decreases) when the actual dividend payout
is greater (lower) than the expected dividend payout by the marginal investors, and
the rate of growth is proportional to the average reaction of the marginal investors
to the new signal. Then, share prices fluctuate also independently from the economic
fundamentals of the company, due to over or under reaction of the investors to news
and shocks. Chan (2003) shows that investors react slowly to valid information, while
they overreact to price shocks, causing huge trading volume and price volatility.
 Proof. Appendix A
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C. Large Shareholder’s Optimality
Given the average prior on the expected dividend payout across the marginal in-
vestors µ¯t, reflected in the share price Pt = P (µ¯t), the large shareholder chooses at
discrete dates τ the optimal number of shares, αL,τ , to maximize the certainty equi-
valent payoff
V (αL,τ )− (αL,τ − αL,τ−)Pτ ,
where





v(αL,t) = αL,tµt − 1
2
α2L,ta
Lσ2Dr + φ(b, αL,t),
is the net benefits flow to the large shareholder at each time t, given by the risk-
adjusted instantaneous dividend process accrued to the large shareholder, plus the
additional inflow of instantaneous private benefits generated by the stake.
So, the certainty equivalent payoff is given by the present value of the net benefits
flow less (plus) the trading costs (gains), where αL,t− stands for the number of shares
at the previous point in time. By taking the first-order derivative with respect to αL,t,
I obtain the large shareholder’s optimality condition:
V
′
= Pτ + (αL,τ − αL,τ−)P ′ , (6)
where the prime index stands for the derivative with respect to the control variable.
Therefore, the optimal demand for shares of the large shareholder equates the total
benefits per share to the total cost of a share. Equation (6), in fact, is the usual
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equilibrium condition that equates benefits and costs, where the total benefits per
share are given by the risk-adjusted cumulative expected dividends plus the private
benefits generated by an additional unit of shares, and the total cost of a share is
given by the share price plus the implicit cost of trading, due to the price impact of
the large shareholder’s stake.
D. Equilibrium
I now characterize the equilibrium stock price and the optimal demand for shares
of the large shareholder, taking into account his impact on the stock price. The equi-
librium risk premium is derived by the market clearing condition in the static context
(sum of investors’ demand for shares equal to total number of shares minus the large
shareholder’s stake), while the average expected dividend payout is derived by the
market clearing condition in the dynamic context (sum of shares purchases equal to
sum of shares sales).




e−r(s−τ)(µ¯τ − ρτ )ds,
where the equilibrium risk premium is ρτ = (1− αL,τ ) ∗ aIσ2Dr, and
µ¯τ = µ¯t<τ + g¯(τ
−)(αL,τ − αL,τ (µ¯t<τ ))
is the average posterior belief on the dividend payout of the firm across the mar-
ginal investors, after the large shareholder’s choice of ownership share, where g¯(τ−) is
the average reaction across the marginal investors to the large shareholder’s choice of
ownership share, αL,τ (µ¯t<τ ) is the average prior across the marginal investors about
the optimal choice of the large shareholder, equal to
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and µ¯t<τ = µ¯(dDt) is the average expected dividend payout across the marginal
investors before the large shareholder’s choice of ownership share, which is function
of the continuous signals given by the company’s cash flows.
 Proof. Appendix A
Proposition 2. Taking into account his price impact, the large shareholder’s op-
timal stake is the following
αL,τ =




+ αL,τ (µ¯t<τ ),
Then, the large shareholder’s optimal stake is the sum of three components: the
speculation on the investors’ mispricing, the expected optimal choice of shares conjec-
tured by the marginal investors, and the gain in the private benefits generated by an
additional share, which is positive only when the additional share allows to reach a
higher threshold. The next section provides closed-form solution in two benchmark
cases, and provides further details on the solution in the general case.
 Proof. Appendix A
E. Main Results
• Perfect Information and No Private Benefits
In case of perfect information and no private benefits, the marginal investors set
the weight to assign to the observation of the large shareholder’s choice αL,τ at
time τ , then g¯(τ) is simply equal to 1/(2aIσ2Dr + aLσ2Dr), so that µ¯t = µt, since




When all the investors have the same set of information, at each point in time,
then the equilibrium stock price is simply given by the present value of the
future dividends payout of the firm, given the true dividends drift µt, minus the





that is the large shareholder immediately trades to the risk-sharing allocation.
This result is equivalent to DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006) in absence of moral
hazard.
• Asymmetric Information and No Private Benefits
With asymmetric information and no private benefits, the information released
by the large shareholder with his optimal demand for shares is clean with re-
spect to the true drift of the dividends process. However, the marginal investors
set the weight to assign to the observation of the large shareholder’s choice αL,τ









In turn, at τ , the large shareholder knows and anticipates the response of the
investors, thus taking into account the impact of his demand for shares. Given
his superior information, the large shareholder can exploit the mispricing of the
marginal investors, thus trading on the difference between his valuation of the
company shares and the average belief by the marginal investors. Therefore,
the large shareholder has always the temptation to trade the company shares in
order to gain on the investors’ mispricing.
However, as the marginal investors learn from the large shareholder’s trade,
the stock price increases when the large shareholder buys, and falls when the
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large shareholder sells. This mechanism makes convex (concave) the trading
costs (profits) for the purchase (sale) of the shares to the large shareholder, and
prevents the large shareholder from trading to his first-best solution, that is the
trading policy in absence of the investors’ learning.
As result, the large shareholder trades gradually, yet not monotonically, at the
discrete dates τ towards the optimal risk-sharing allocation, while the marginal
investors accordingly update their belief on the company expected dividends
payout. Indeed, the magnitude of the large shareholder’s trade, and so the speed
of the adjustment towards the optimal risk-sharing solution, is inversely propor-
tional to the average reaction of the marginal investors (g(τ−)) to his trade. This
result is equivalent to DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006) in the presence of moral
hazard.
• Asymmetric Information and Private Benefits
With also private benefits, finally, the information released by the large share-
holder with his optimal demand for shares is noisy with respect to the true drift










where the actual αµL,τ− is not indeed observable and therefore proxied by 1/(2a
Iσ2Dr+
aLσ2Dr)
While in absence of private benefits the large shareholder always trades at the
discrete dates τ , with additional private benefits the large shareholder may not
trade at all.
The no-trade occurs when the large shareholder’s stake is at a given threshold
(αL,τ = αj). The purchase of a share would not produce any additional private
benefit while making even more undiversified and suboptimal the investments
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portfolio of the large shareholder. On the other side, selling a share produces a
loss in private benefits (φ(αL,τ < αj) = b ∗ αj−1) which may not be compensated
by the gain in risk diversification.
The large shareholder, instead, sells a block of shares when the difference in the
valuation, against the marginal investors, is negative (the share is overvalued)
and large enough to make convenient the trade, even if this happens at the cost
of loosing a given amount of private benefits, and the shares depreciate because
of the sale, given the price impact of his sale. On the other hand, the large
shareholder is willing to buy an additional block of shares, in order to reach
the higher stake threshold that generates additional private benefits, only when
the difference in the valuation becomes positive (the share is undervalued) and
large enough, taking into account the implicit cost of trading due to the share
appreciation.
F. Price Impact of Private Benefits
Private benefits affect the equilibrium stock price in two directions. In fact, let re-
mind that the equilibrium stock price depends on both the average expected dividend
across the marginal investors following the large shareholder’s demand for shares at
the discrete dates τ , and on the equilibrium risk premium ρ derived by the market
clearing condition
Pτ = P (µ¯(αL,τ ), ρ(αL,τ ))
Then, it is straightforward to note that private benefits increase the equilibrium
stock price by reducing the equilibrium risk premium. In fact, private benefits in-
crease the optimal demand for shares of the large shareholder, then reducing the
equilibrium risk premium sought by the marginal shareholders to invest in the firm.
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In practice, a larger demand for shares of the large shareholder reduces the number
of shares tradable on the market, under the assumption of fixed shares supply, thus
raising the stock price.
Moreover, private benefits affect the belief of the marginal investors about the
true expected dividend payout of the firm, and in particular the update of the belief
following the observation of the large shareholder’s decision in terms of ownership
share at τ . First, since private benefits drive the optimal demand for shares of the
large shareholder, then private benefits impact on the distance between the actual
and the expected choice, across the marginal investors, of the large shareholder’s
ownership share:
(αL,τ − αL,τ (µ¯t<τ ))
Further, private benefits affect the weight assigned to the observation of the large
shareholder’s choice. As the choice of the large shareholder is driven by additional
motives with respect to the dividend payout of the company, then this choice is a
noisy signal on the dividend payout of the company, therefore the marginal investors
assign a lower weight to that observation for updating their beliefs.
III. Structural Estimation
In this section, I report the actual data used for the estimation, then I state the
estimation problem, by describing the quantities to estimate, the parameters that
are calibrated and the observable variables involved in the estimation, and I describe
the identification process, which links the observable variables to the unobservable




The universe of firms consists of the public companies listed in the Italian Stock
Exchange, where they are classified by market capitalization. I consider all the non-
financial firms listed in the Large, Medium, and Small Capitalization indexes. The
source of data for the ownership share of the large shareholders over time is Thom-
son Reuters Eikon, which combines public and private information on the ownership
structure of public companies. However, I double-check manually the data by using
the website of the Consob, the Italian security exchange commission, that releases
information on the ownership structure of the public companies every six months, on
the base of the company disclosure. Hence, I use biannual data on the largest share-
holder’s stake between March 2004 and September 2016 (24 observations). Thomson
Reuters Datastream, on the other hand, provides also data on stock prices and earn-
ings per share.
My final sample is obtained by selecting only the firms reporting the same largest
shareholder for at least 75% of the observations, in order to increase the likelihood
of identifying correctly the controlling shareholder of the firm, and deleting the firms
with missing data over the time series. The final sample, then, consists of 78 firms,
936 firm-year data on the earnings-per-share, 1872 firm-biannual data on sharehold-
ings and stock prices, and 280800 firm-day observations on daily stock prices.
The large shareholder’s average and median stake is around 50%, and it is quite
stable over the entire time series (Figure 3, left panel). Indeed, the trading activity
of the large shareholder is very low over time. I observe a trade in only 18% of the
total observations, where I refer to trade as the non-zero difference between two con-
secutive stake observations, and the average number of trades across firms is slightly
above 4 (out of 24 observations for each firm).
Moreover, when they do, they usually trade big blocks of shares: the mean (me-
dian) trade is 4.27% (1.17%) of the outstanding shares. Finally, they rarely trade
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Median Std 10th pct 90th pct
Company Data Total Assets 1.24 0.15 3.42 0.01 2.79
Debt-To-Equity 1.72 0.87 14.77 0.11 2.45
Earning-Per-Share 0.30 0.14 1.02 -0.25 1.17
FCF-Per-Share 0.94 0.48 1.49 -0.01 2.39
Stock Data Daily Returns (%) 1.48 -0.38 20.92 -19.32 22.83
Daily Turnover 0.38 0.23 0.60 0.02 5.26
LS Data Stake (%) 48.63 53.29 17.53 18.88 66.96
Trade (%) 4.27 0.41 1.17 0.00 4.35
N of Trades 3.33 3 2.34 1 6
The table reports the descriptive statistics at company, stock, and largest shareholder levels.
The statistics are the mean, the median, the standard deviation, the 10th and the 90th per-
centiles, computed over the 78 final sample, between March 2004 and Septmber 2016. Com-
pany data are on annual basis, and are the total value of assets (in millions of euro), the
debt-to-equity ratio, the earnings-per-share, and the free cash flow-per-share. Stock data are
on daily basis, and are the returns and the number of shares traded divided by the number of
outstanding shares. Largest shareholder data are on biannual basis, and are the percentage
of shares held by the largest shareholder, the variation over time of the largest shareholder’s
stake, and the number of times the stake of the largest shareholder changes.
small blocks of shares. I observe a trade that involves less than 1% of the outstanding
shares in only 7.79% of total observations.
In summary, the large shareholders show an ownership dynamics quite stable
over time, and they trade very infrequently, usually buying or selling large blocks of
shares. By contrast, the sample firms are characterised by a huge trading volume
over time, and the stock prices fluctuate significantly, thus showing a substantial
trading activity of the mass of shareholders and investors operating in the market.
On average, 0.38% of the outstanding shares are traded every day.
B. Parameters Calibration
The steps of the private benefits function (αj), and the aggregate risk aversion coef-
ficient (aI), are calibrated to the Italian data, for consistency with the actual dataset
used for the estimation. In particular, I set aI equal to 2, following Guiso, Sapienza,
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Figure 3. Largest Shareholders: Stake and Trading
The left panel shows the mean (blue line) and the median (dotted line) ownership share, as
percentage of outstanding shares, across the largest shareholders of the final 78 sample firms,
between March 2004 and September 2016, at biannual frequency. The right panel shows the
distribution of the number of trades of the largest shareholders of the final 78 sample firms,
where a trade is defined as a non-zero difference between two consecutive stake observations.
and Zingales (2008) who measure the aggregate risk aversion on a large set of clients
of an Italian bank. The private benefits thresholds follow the Italian law regarding
the ownership structure of public listed companies. The thresholds are listed in table
II:
The rights (and the obligations) linked to each stake level are triggered as soon as
the shareholder reaches a given threshold, that motivates the assumption that the
stake generates a given amount of private benefits for a given threshold only if the
stake is greater or equal than that threshold, while holding a stake even one share
lower than a threshold generates private benefits according to the lower threshold (if
αL = 29.99%, then φ(αL) = b ∗ (10%)).
The following figure shows the empirical no-trade thresholds observed on the
sample firms, where I define no-trade threshold a stake level at which the large share-
holder of the company does not trade, that is the large shareholder remains on that
ownership share for at least two consecutive observations. Note that the largest num-
ber of no-trade thresholds are observed around 30%, and between 50% and 70%.
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Table II. Ownership Share Thresholds
Ownership Share Right/Commitment
3% Obligation to stake disclosure
10% Right to call shareholders meeting
30% Obligation to launch takeover
50% Company control
66% Right to call extraordinary meeting
100% Full ownership
The table describes the ownership share thresholds that a shareholder has to attain in or-
der to acquire a given right, or that triggers a given commitment, according to the Italian
commercial law. The thresholds are expressed as percentage of the outstanding shares.
C. Structural parameters and latent variables
I estimate the model firm-by-firm. For each firm, I estimate the following set of
parameters
θ = {aL, σD, σ, b, g¯(0), σ2},
that is the large shareholder’s absolute risk aversion coefficient, the dividends shocks
volatility, the dividends drift shocks volatility, the parameter that quantifies the private
benefits extracted by the large shareholder, for a given discrete step function, the ini-
tial weight assigned to the large shareholder’s choice in terms of ownership share by
the marginal investors to update their belief on µt, and the noise on µt of the inform-
ation released by the large shareholder’s choice due to the private benefits.
Moreover, for each firm, I infer the dynamics of the following set of latent variables
Xt = {µt, µ¯t}
that includes the true dividends drift and the average expected dividends drift across
the marginal investors.
I estimate the model by using stock prices, ownership share of the large share-
holders, and earnings-per-share.
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Figure 4. Empirical No-Trade Thresholds
The figure shows the distribution of the no-trade ownership shares observed on the 78 final
sample firms. The no-trade share is defined as the ownership share observed at least for two
consecutive observations for a given largest shareholder, that is the ownership share at which
the largest shareholder does not trade at least across two periods. The red vertical dotted
lines are the stake thresholds described in Table II.
C.1. First Step
In the first step, I estimate {σD, σ} by using daily stock prices, that proxy the con-
tinuous evolution of the equilibrium share price in the model. To estimate, I discretize
the equations (5) and (2), respectively, take the conditional expectation at time t, and
derive the following set of diffusion equations that link the two latent variables:
Et[µ¯t+1] = (1− k¯t)µ¯t + k¯µt, (7)
where kt measures the average reaction to the new payout observation across the
marginal investors, and
Et[µt+1] = µt, (8)
as Et[dDt] = µt, that is the true time-varying drift of the dividends process, and
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Et[dµt] = 0. The conditional covariance matrix, then, of the two latent variables is
diagonal4. The diagonal matrix depends on both σD and σ:
Σt+1|t (Xt) = Diag(σ2, k¯tσ2D)
On the other hand, the stock price is linked to the two state variables according to





I(1− αL,t)) + µ¯t] (9)
Therefore, given a prior on µt and µ¯t, I can compute a predicted stock price at each
time t, by using the above equation, then obtaining a prediction error
et = P˜t − Pˆt,
where P˜t is the actual stock price, and Pˆt is the predicted stock price. Then, the
errors are function of the structural parameters and the latent variables, i.e. et =
e(aI , σ2D, Xt), and the covariance matrix of the prediction errors depends on the deriv-
ative of the stock price with respect to the state variables and the conditional variance









4In the next formula, kt is allowed to vary over time to proxy the evolution of the average reaction





where νt = wt + σ, and at each time step wt is updated by using (1 − kt−1)νt−1, and initializing the
recursion with a large value of ν0. This procedure allows to proxy the prior update on the dividends












So, I construct a likelihood function on the prediction errors, under the assumption
of normality, that I maximize with respect to σ:



















where δ(Dt) stands for the innovations in the earnings-per-share, and the above con-
dition is derived from equation (1), noting that
var(δ(dDt)) = var(δ(dµt)) + 2var(dDt − µt) = σ2 + 2σ2D,
The maximization of the likelihood function, combined with the condition on the
variance of the innovations in the earning-per-share, allows to simultaneously estim-
ate σD and σ, and infer the dynamics of the two state variables. The second result is
achieved by iterating the updating and the predicting equations of the linear Kalman
filter.5 In particular, for each time t, the prior estimate on Xt is updated on the base of
the prediction error, thus obtaining a posterior estimate in a bayesian fashion of Xt,
that is used as prior estimate for the next point in time.
C.2. Second Step
In the second step, I estimate {aL, g¯(0), σ2} by using biannual stock prices and con-
temporaneous ownership share of large shareholders. By using the model equilibrium
5Details on the Kalman filter implementation, and details on the identification of kt are provided in
the appendix
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conditions, I arrive at one equation that describes the stock price at the discrete dates
τ , when the large shareholder discloses his choice in terms of demand for shares,
as function only of the exogenous variables and the demand for shares of the large
shareholder, by eliminating all the remaining endogenous quantities determined in
the model.
Given µ¯t<τ that I have estimated in the previous step with daily stock prices, the
evolution of the biannual stock prices is endogenously determined using αL,τ , g¯(τ),
and αL,τ (µ¯t<τ ), where g¯(τ) is function of the exogenous parameters and g¯(τ−), and
αL,τ (µ¯t<τ ) is function of the exogenous parameters and αL,τ−.
Hence, using again the equation (9), and similar approach to the previous step, I
can compute a predicted stock price at each date τ , where I use µ¯τ , as determined in
the model, to form my prediction on the stock price, thus obtaining again a prediction
error at each date τ . Once more, the errors are function of the structural paramet-
ers and the latent variable µ¯τ . The conditional variance of the state variable is now
simply k¯tσ2D, while the variance of the prediction errors depends again on the derivat-
ive of the stock price with respect to the state variable, now simply given by 1/r, and
the conditional variance of the state variable. Then, I construct a likelihood function
on the prediction errors, under the assumption of normality, that I maximize with
respect to {aL, g¯(0), σ2}.
D. Identifying Private Benefits
Now, I describe the identification process of the private benefits parameter b. In
particular, I derive upper and lower bounds for b, for each firm-large shareholder.
First, let JLτ = J (αL,τ , b) denote the maximal certainty equivalent payoff for the large




e−r(s−τ)v∗s(αL,τ )ds− (αL,τ − αL,τ−)P (αL,τ ),
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where v∗(αL,τ ) is the maximal net benefits flow to the large shareholder, given the
optimal demand for shares αL,τ .
JLτ can be written as JLτ = JCτ + JBτ , where





Hence, JCτ is the present value of the risk-adjusted instantaneous dividend process
accrued to the large shareholder less (plus) the trading costs (gains), and JBτ is the
present value of the private benefits flow. Let define JCτ as the marginal utility of the
large shareholder. Then, note that without private benefits the actual choice αL,τ is
not optimal, that is
JCτ < J (αm,τ , 0)
where αm,τ denotes the number of shares that the large shareholder would choose as
optimal solution in absence of private benefits, thus behaving as a marginal investor
with perfect information. αm,τ solves the utility maximization problem of the large
shareholder when b=0, for a given dynamics of µt and µ¯t, risk aversion coefficient aL,
dividends shock volatility σD, initial updating weight g¯(0), and using the fact that
in absence of private benefits σ2 = 0. Hence, it is possible to compute both JCτ and
J (αm,τ , 0), by using the implied dynamics of µt, and the parameters estimates.
Then, the gain in terms of private benefits must be at least equal to the loss in
terms of marginal utility, choosing αL,τ rather than αm,τ :
φ(α(L, t))− φ(α(m, t)) > J (αm,t, 0)− JCτ ,
from which I derive the lower bound for b, where φ(α(L, t)) = b∗αj(L, t) and φ(α(m, t)) =
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b ∗ αj(m, t), and αj(L, t) and αj(m, t) are the thresholds associated to αL,t and αm,t, re-
spectively. So,
b >
J (αm,t, 0)− JCτ
(αj(L, t)− αj(m, t)) = b
l
On the other hand, the private benefits that the large shareholder can extract
from the stake are not large enough to make convenient for the large shareholder
to increase his stake up to a higher threshold. In other words, jumping to a higher
threshold would produce gains in terms of private benefits not sufficient to cover the
loss in terms of marginal utility:
φ(αj+1(L, t))− φ(αj(L, t)) < J (αj+1,t, 0)− JCτ ,
from which I derive the upper bound for b, where αj+1(L, t) is the threshold above the
one associated to αL,t (e.g., if αL,t is 53%, then αj(L, t) is 50% and αj+1(L, t) is 66%).
So,
b <
J (αj+1,t, 0)− JCτ
(αj+1(L, t)− αj(L, t)) = b
u
E. Estimating the price impact
The estimation of the price impact of the private benefits involves a simple coun-
terfactual analysis. First, note that the observed stock price is the stock price that
reflects the private benefits. In fact, the observed stock price, at the discrete dates at
which the large shareholder discloses the stake, depends on the large shareholder’s
stake.
Then, in the counterfactual analysis, I compare the observed stock price, at the
discrete disclosure dates, with two unobservable stock prices: the stock price in ab-
sence of private benefits, that is the equilibrium stock price when there is one large
31
shareholder that is fully informed about the true expected payout of the firm, and the
stock price in absence of a large shareholder, that is the equilibrium stock price when
the marginal investors do not receive any additional signal at the discrete disclosure
dates to update their beliefs. Let Pm denote the equilibrium stock price in absence of
private benefits, and P n the equilibrium stock price in absence of a large shareholder,
then
Pmτ = P (µ¯(αm,τ ), ρ(αm,τ )) ,







P˜τ − P nτ
P nτ
,
where ψm and ψn denote the (percentage) price impact in the two different cases,
respectively.
I estimate the price impact at the disclosure discrete dates τ , that is at biannual
frequency. I compute both Pm and P n by using the equation (9). As for Pmτ , I first
determine the optimal stake of the large shareholder in absence of private benefits,
αm,τ , for a given dynamics of µt and µ¯t, risk aversion coefficient aL, dividends shock
volatility σD, initial updating weight g¯(0), and using the fact that in absence of private
benefits σ2 = 0. Then I derive the equilibrium risk premium and the updated belief
about the dividends drift across the marginal investors (µ¯τ ), thus obtaining the equi-
librium stock price. Computing P nτ , instead, requires only the dynamics of µ¯t, and the
equilibrium risk premium is simply given by aIσ2Dr.
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Table III. Parameters Estimates and Goodness of Fit
Mean Median Std 10th pct 90th pct
σ 0.024 0.016 0.028 0.002 0.051
σD 0.279 0.210 0.294 0.038 0.639
aL 2.664 2.137 1.452 1.131 4.999
b 0.001 0.000 0.008 -0.003 0.009
g¯(0) 0.137 0.041 0.172 0.000 0.493
σ2 0.584 0.764 0.405 0.000 0.998
Mean Median
Actual Fitted Actual Fitted
Stock Price volatility 1.98 2.05 1.22 1.19
LS Trading volatility 0.029 0.031 0.016 0.014
Trade (% of shares) 7.73 11.73 3.64 5.46
Actual Fitted
N of Trades ≥ 1% 10.76% 6.63%
The table reports statistics on the parameters estimates for the final sample of 78 firms. The
parameters are estimated firm-by-firm, by using maximum likelihood. σ and σD are estim-
ated with daily stock prices and annual earnings-per-share, aL, g¯(0) and σ2 are estimated
with biannual stock prices and ownership shares, b is the average between the lower bound bl
and the upper bound bu. The goodness of fit shows the comparison between actual empirical
moments on stock price, large shareholder’s stake and trading (averaged across firms), and
estimation-implied moments on stock price, large shareholder’s stake and trading. Moreover,
the bottom line compares the observed number of trades with the estimated-implied number




Table III reports parameter estimates (top panel), and goodness of fit in terms of
empirical moments on stock prices and large shareholders’ stake and trading (bottom
panel).
The volatility of the exogenous shocks to the dividends process of the firm (σD) is
widely larger than the volatility of the shocks (σ) in the dynamics of the fundamental
value of the firm, proxied by the true time-varying drift of the dividends process. We
can interpret in the real data the continuous dynamics of the dividends process of the
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model as the daily arrival of news and information about the state of the firm.
The estimate of the large shareholder’s risk aversion coefficient is close to the value
calibrated for the aggregate risk aversion. Further, estimates on g¯(0) document het-
erogeneity across firms in terms of initial weight assigned to the large shareholder’s
stake by the marginal investors, and also in terms of noise of the information released
by the large shareholders with their demand for shares.
The bottom panel compares the model in-sample predictions on the dynamics of
stock prices and large shareholders’ stake to their corresponding actual values in the
data. The estimated model performs well in replicating these features of the data,
even though the stylized facts on the dynamics of large shareholders’ stake have not
been explicitly targeted by the estimation model. Mean and median across firms of
the large shareholders’ trading volatility are almost equal between real data (1.98%,
and 1.22%, respectively) and model-implied estimates (2.05%, and 1.19%), and close
in terms of size of trade (7.73%, and 3.64% in real data, and 11.73% and 5.46% in the
model). The differences between real data and model predictions, in terms of size of
trade, and also in terms of number of trades (10.76% and 6.63%, respectively), are
likely due to the exogenous thresholds imposed in model, so that the model tends to
predict larger blocks trades than the actual trades, but with a lower frequency.
B. Private Benefits
I use the estimated parameter b, and the actual stake of the large shareholder, to
compute the present value per share of the private benefits flow, defined in the model
as Jb, for each firm, and each disclosure date τ . I report results on Jb in terms of
stock price, then Jb,τ/Pτ is the measure of the present value of the private benefits
flow extracted by large shareholders with their stake, in terms of equity value of the
firm. The left panel of figure 5 reports the time series of mean and median across
firms at each biannual date, and the right panel of figure 5 reports the distribution of
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Figure 5. Private Benefits over Stock Price
The left panel shows the mean (red line) and the median (blue dotted line) across firms, for
each biannual date between March 2004 and September 2016, of the present value of the
private benefits flow (Jb), divided by the stock price at the same date. The right panel shows
the distribution of the present value of the private benefits flow divided by the stock price over
the 78 sample firms, where for each firm I compute the average ratio over time.
the average over time for each sample firm. Statistics on the distribution are shown
in table IV.
Private benefits count, on average across firms, for around 2% of the total equity
value over time. This number is slightly lower than the estimate of Albuquerque
and Schroth (2010). Similarly to Albuquerque and Schroth (2010), I also document
a pronounced positive skewness in the distribution across firms, where the mean
is much higher than the median, and does not provide an accurate picture of the
results. Half of the large shareholders (40% in Albuquerque and Schroth (2010))
extract private benefits less than 1% of the total equity value, and the maximum rate
of private benefits is 20% (15%).
Then, I report the overall certainty equivalent payoff of the large shareholders’
stakes, defined in the model as JL, that is the sum of the present value of the private
benefits flow plus the marginal utility, that is the present value of the risk adjusted
dividends flow plus (minus) the trading costs (gains). Remind that the certainty equi-
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Figure 6. Certainty Equivalent of Large Shareholders
The left panel shows the mean (red line) and the median (blue dotted line) across firms, for
each biannual date between March 2004 and September 2016, of the certainty equivalent
payoff of the largest shareholder (JL), divided by the stock price at the same date, and the
largest shareholder’s stake. The right panel shows the mean (red line) and the median (blue
dotted line) across firms, for each biannual date between March 2004 and September 2016,
of the marginal component of the certainty equivalent payoff of the largest shareholder (JC),
divided by the stock price at the same date, and the largest shareholder’s stake.
valent payoff is simply the valuation of the stake by an investor, so the maximum
price at which the investor is willing to buy that block of shares. I report results in
terms of stock price, dividing by the large shareholders’ stake, so that JLτ /(Pτ ∗αL,τ ) is
equal to 1 when the large shareholder valuates one share exactly as the market does.
The left panel of figure 6 reports the time series of mean and median across firms
at each biannual date for JLτ /(Pτ ∗ αL,τ ), and the right panel of figure 6 reports the
time series of mean and median across firms at each biannual date for JCτ /(Pτ ∗ αL,τ ),
that is the marginal component of the certainty equivalent payoff of large sharehold-
ers’ stakes. Statistics on the distributions of the average over time for each firm are
shown in table IV.
Intuitively, the large shareholders valuate their stakes more than the market
price. With risk aversion, an investor is willing to buy a stock only if the certainty
equivalent is above the market price of the stock. The difference between the total
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Figure 7. Price impact over time. All Firms
The left panel shows the mean (red line) and the median (blue dotted line) across firms,
for each biannual date between March 2004 and September 2016, of the price impact of the
private benefits extracted by the largest shareholder (ψn). The right panel shows the mean
(red line) and the median (blue dotted line) across firms, for each biannual date between
March 2004 and September 2016, of the price impact of the overall large shareholder’s stake
(ψm).
and the marginal large shareholders’ certainty equivalent is due to the private bene-
fits. So, private benefits contribute to compensate large shareholders for holding very
undiversified portfolios, thus keeping the stake valuation of the large shareholders
always above the market price of the stock.
C. Price Impact
Finally, I use the model estimates to compute the (percentage) price impact of
the private benefits of control, and of the overall large shareholder’s stake, defined
as ψm and ψn, respectively. Figure 7 reports the time series of mean and median
across all sample firms at each biannual date, and Figure 8 reports the time series
of the average across two different types of large shareholders at each biannual date:
corporations, and individuals. Statistics on the distributions of the average over time
for each firm are shown in table IV.
Overall, private benefits of control have positive impact on stock prices, so they
37
Table IV. Private Benefits and Stock Price
Panel A: All Sample
Mean Median 10th pct 90th pct
JL/P 1.015 1.014 0.984 1.053
Jb/P 0.018 0.003 -0.015 0.054
JC/P 0.997 1.006 0.945 1.054
ψm 0.020 0.002 -0.021 0.096
ψn 0.048 0.028 -0.001 0.128
Panel B: Corporations
Mean Median 10th pct 90th pct
JL/P 1.018 1.022 0.982 1.063
Jb/P 0.029 0.009 -0.016 0.105
JC/P 0.989 1.002 0.865 1.052
ψm 0.032 0.003 -0.018 0.127
ψn 0.060 0.046 0.001 0.149
Panel C: Individuals
Mean Median 10th pct 90th pct
JL/P 1.013 1.014 1.001 1.023
Jb/P 0.011 0.001 -0.010 0.011
JC/P 1.002 1.007 0.967 1.059
ψm 0.009 0.002 -0.026 0.029
ψn 0.039 0.021 -0.002 0.132
The table reports statistics on the total certainty equivalent payoff of the large shareholder,
the marginal certainty equivalent payoff of the large shareholder, and the present value of
the private benefits flow, in terms of stock price, and on the price impact of private benefits
and presence of large shareholder. First, I compute the average over time for each firm for
these quantities, then I report in this table mean, median, and 80% confidence interval across
firms, for all sample firms, and by type of large shareholder.
are generally not extracted with cost for the rest of the company shareholders. The
average price impact over time fluctuates between 1% and 3%, and the mean is always
significantly larger than the median, signalling again highly positive skewness. The
price impact of private benefits, in fact, is quite heterogenous across firms. For 15%
of the firms, in fact, private benefits have a negative impact greater than 1%, and for
the same proportion of firms private benefits have a positive impact larger than 5%.
The impact of the overall large shareholder’s stake is even more beneficial to the
rest of the investors. For 15% of the firms, in fact, the presence of the large share-
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Figure 8. Price impact over time. Types of shareholders
The left panel shows the mean, across the firms where the largest shareholder is a corpora-
tion (black line) and the firms where the largest shareholder is an individual (sky-blue line),
for each biannual date between March 2004 and September 2016, of the price impact of the
private benefits extracted by the largest shareholder (ψn). The right panel shows the mean,
across the firms where the largest shareholder is a corporation (black line) and the firms
where the largest shareholder is an individual (dotted line), for each biannual date between
March 2004 and September 2016, of the price impact of the overall large shareholder’s stake
(ψm).
holder increases the stock price by more than 10%, and for only 6% of the firms the
negative impact is greater than 1%. In general, the positive price impact of both
private benefits and large shareholder’s stake is substantially greater during the
crisis of 2011-2012. This suggests that large shareholders support stock prices and
are significantly beneficial to the rest of the investors over negative economic cycles.
In untabulated results, I find that the average price impact of private benefits across
firms is 3.17% at the beginning of 2012 (at the boom of the European sovereign debt
crisis) and only 0.96% at the beginning of 2007, before the start of the great financial
crisis. Moreover, the overall average price impact of large shareholders across firms
is 7.87% at the beginning of 2012, and only 2.27% at the beginning of 2007.
Table IV shows that corporate large shareholders exert more beneficial effect to the
stock price than individuals, both in terms of private benefits and presence of large
shareholder, and both over time and across firms. The combination between positive
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price impact of corporate large shareholders, and positive estimate of private benefits
extracted by corporate large shareholders, offers the evidence of a synergistic effect
between owner and owned firm. In this case, in fact, I document a reciprocal beneficial
effect so that private benefits are not extracted at cost for the rest of shareholders, and
they can be properly defined as synergies.
V. Conclusion
The paper estimates private benefits of control using the restrictions provided by
a dynamic model of optimal shareholding, with asymmetric information and hetero-
genous shareholders. The model equilibrium conditions allows to quantify the price
impact of large shareholders and private benefits of control over time. The estimation
results provide evidence that large shareholders have positive impact on stock prices
that does not vanish over time, so that they extract private benefits without cost for
the rest of the company shareholders. On the other side, private benefits contribute
to compensate large shareholders for holding very undiversified portfolios. When the
large shareholder is a corporation, for instance, this reciprocal beneficial effect sheds
light on a synergy between owned and owner firm.
While this paper proposes the first structural approach to quantify the price im-
pact of large shareholders over time, both the theoretical and the empirical analysis
is far from being exhausted. The main challenge is to disentangle the two drivers
of the heterogeneity between large shareholder and marginal investors, namely the
opportunity to extract private benefits and the superior information. Larger set of
observable and informative data, further than a more elegant theoretical model, may
potentially produce substantial improvement in the fit of the data, thus also providing
evidence of a larger impact of large shareholders on stock prices.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Appendix A.1. Investors’ Optimality Conditions
To derive the optimality conditions of the marginal investor, I follow the same
approach of DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006). First, I formulate the investor’s conjec-
ture about the price process, and I conjecture a value function for the investor in the
customary form as in DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006). Then, I derive the Bellman equa-
tion, to be maximized with respect to the control variables α and c. Finally, I derive
the equilibrium risk premium, and the equilibrium share price in Proposition 1.
In a CARA-utility framework, with normality assumption on the dividend payout,
the conjecture of the price process is the following
dPt = (rPt + ρt − µ¯t)dt,
that is the share price grows at the riskless rate, plus a risk premium component ρ to
compensate the investor’s risk aversion, and to be determined in equilibrium, minus
the biased expected dividend payout.
Then, for a given price process, the investor’s optimality conditions are the follow-
ings:
uc = JW ,
where uc denotes the marginal utility from consumption, and JW is the partial
derivative of the value function of the investor, that is his expected payoff on each
point in time, with respect to the state variable wealth, and
αi,t =
µi,t − µ¯t + ρ
arσ2
,
where µ¯t is the average expected dividend across the marginal investors, and the
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risk premium ρ compensates the investor’s risk aversion. By market clearing, that is∫
i
αi,tdi = 1− αL,t for each t, the equilibrium risk premium is given by
ρt = (1− αL,t)aIrσ2,










In fact, let the riskless holdings of the investor to evolve as follows, for given con-
sumption level ct, shareholding αt, and share price Pt
dBt = (rBt − ct)dt+ αtdDt − Ptdαt,
The wealth of the investor is defined as W = αP + B. Then, the expected value of
the wealth accumulation over time, dWt = dBt + αtdPt + Ptdαt, is
1
dt
Et[dW ] = rWt + αt(µi,t + ρt − µ¯t)− ct = rWt + αt(ρt + ei,t − e¯t)− ct































2 + u(c) = RJ,
Substituting dW , taking the expectation at t, and maximizing over c and α, I obtain
the equations of optimality in the desired form, where JW = arJ , and JWW = −aJW .6
Appendix A.2. Equilibrium Stock Price
























Then, impose the market clearing condition, so that
∫
i
αi,t = 1(1− αL,t), substitute αi,t
and solve for Pt,
Pt =






µi,tdi, and aI =
∫
i
(1/ai)di. So, Pt can be written as
6For the proof that the Bellman equation holds, and the conditions to avoid doubling strategies and






where ρs = (1− αL,t) ∗ aIσ2Dr
Appendix A.3. Evolution of average expected dividend
First, I derive the evolution over time of the demand for shares of the investors,
by setting αi,t as function of µi,t and µ¯t, then using Ito’s lemma. The investor, then,
buys (sells) company shares when the change in her expectation about the future di-
vidend is greater (lower) than the change in the average expectation about the future





where dµi,t = ki(dDt− Ei,t(dDt)).
Note then that the market clearing condition holds also in a dynamic fashion:∫
i










(ki(dDt− Ei,t(dDt))) = k¯(dDt − µt),
since ki and Ei,t(dDt) are independent.
Appendix A.4. Proposition 1
The proof of the proposition 1 is simply the combination between the two previous
proofs, at the disclosure dates τ . When the large shareholder discloses his stake, then
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each investor i revises the prior on µt, and so the optimal demand for shares, so that,




(dµi,τ − dµ¯τ ),
where dµi,τ = gi(τ−)(αL,τ − Et<τ (αL,τ )), with Et<τ (αL,τ ) equal across the investors as it
is common knowledge at τ , and
dµ¯τ = µ¯τ − µ¯t<τ
Again, the market clearing condition holds in a dynamic fashion:
∫
i











(gi(αL,τ − Et<τ (αL,τ )))di = g¯(τ−)(αL,τ − Et<τ (αL,τ ))














Then, impose the market clearing condition, so that
∫
i
αi,τ = (1− αL,τ ), substitute αi,τ
and solve for Pτ ,
Pτ =






µi,τdi, and aI =
∫
i





where the equilibrium risk premium is ρτ = (1− αL,τ ) ∗ aIσ2Dr
Appendix A.5. Proposition 2
Next, consider the large shareholder’s certainty equivalent payoff,
V (αL,τ )− (αL,τ − αL,τ−)Pτ ,
write Pτ and Vτ in the explicit form, take the derivative with respect to α, and solve
explicitly for αL,τ ,
αL,τ =
µt − µ¯τ + (1 + αL,τ−)aIσ2Dr + φ(αL,τ )
∆
,
where ∆ = 2aIσ2Dr + aLσ2Dr.
Now, let define







µt − µ¯τ + φ(αL,τ )
∆
+ αL,τ (µ¯t<τ )
then substitute µ¯τ = µ¯t<τ + g¯(τ−)(αL,τ − αL,τ (µ¯t<τ )), collect common terms over αL,τ
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and αL,τ (µ¯t<τ ), and solve again explicitly for αL,τ , thus obtaining the desired form.
Appendix B. Kalman Filter
The Kalman filter allows to reconstruct the dynamics of a latent variable, by using
observable variables, and a given known relationship between latent and observable
variables. The relationship between observed and unobserved variables forms the
measurement equation, while the evolution over time of the latent variable is called
transition equation.
In few words, the filter starts from a prior on the latent variable, and forms a
prediction of the next step value of the latent following the diffusion described in the
transition equation. Then, the filter makes a forecast of the observable variable based
on the prediction of the latent, by using the relationship described in the measure-
ment equation. At each time step, the filter generates an error, given by the distance
between the actual value of the observable and the forecast. The error is then used to
update the prior on the latent, for a given weight assigned to the error, which is called
Kalman Gain. Moreover, the errors depend on the model parameters, so under the
assumption of normality the errors are used to construct a likelihood function that is
maximized with respect to the model parameters.
In my set up, the transition equations describe the evolution of the average expec-
ted dividend across the marginal investors, and the true time-varying dividends drift,
that are defined in the equation (7) and (8), respectively. The parameter k¯ in equation





where νt = wt + σ, and at each time step wt is updated by using (1 − kt−1)νt−1, and
initializing the recursion with a large value of ν0. This procedure allows to proxy the
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prior update on the dividends drift across the marginal investors. Moreover, the state
prediction on µ¯t has variance equal to ωt+k2t σ2D, where the second term is the variance
of the state, conditional at time t, derived by the market clearing equation. The state
prediction on µt has variance equal to ωt+σ2, ωt is updated at each time step according
to the Kalman Gain, and the recursion is initialized with a large value of ω0.
The measurement processes, instead, come from the pricing equation defined in
(9), and I assume that the actual prices are observed with noise, for instance due to
microstructure issues, so that
P˜t = Pt + 1,t,
where the noises are gaussian, with zero mean and variance σ2P .
Hence, starting from an initial guess {µ0,µ¯0}, I define the prediction for {µ1,µ¯1} by
using the transition equations. Then, given the prediction on the state, I compute
the forecast for the share price P1, thus obtaining a prediction error, by using the
actual observations P˜1. Combining the errors with the Kalman Gain, I update the
prior for the state, and iterate recursively the filter up to the end of the time series.
The Kalman Gain is the optimal weight to assign to prediction error in order to revise
the prior on the state variable. It is derived by minimizing the conditional variance
(covariance matrix) of the state variable(s).
Appendix C. Simulation Study
To test the accuracy of the estimation methodology, I perform a numerical analysis
over 1000 simulations. I simulate the dynamics of the dividends time varying drift,
and the dividends process of the firm, according to the equations (1) and (2), with daily
frequency (δt = 1/250), for a set of arbitrary values of σ and σD. I also simulate a mass
of marginal CARA-maximizer investors, who observe dDt and update their prior on µt
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Table V. Parameters Estimates: Simulation Study
True Mean Median 10th pct 90th pct
σ 0.1 0.093 0.093 0.087 0.099
σD 0.2 0.202 0.199 0.132 0.274
aL 8 8.71 7.97 7.10 10.36
b 0.02 0.019 0.021 0.007 0.027
g¯(0) 0.1 0.097 0.099 0.082 0.105
σ2 0.2 0.189 0.188 0.138 0.245
according to their heterogenous prior variances, thus obtaining an average expected
dividend across the marginal investors,µ¯t, for each t.
Next, for given parameter b and thresholds of the private benefits function, ag-
gregate risk aversion coefficient aI , large shareholder’s risk aversion coefficient aL,
initial average weight g¯(0) and noise σ assigned to the large shareholder’s choice by
the marginal investors for updating their beliefs at the discrete disclosure dates, I
obtain the time series of the large shareholder’s stake and the equilibrium stock price
with biannual frequency (δτ = 0.5).
Then, using daily stock prices, I estimate σ and σD, and I infer the dynamics of µt
and µ¯t, which I use in the second step to estimate the remaining parameters by using
biannual stock prices and large shareholder’s stakes. Finally, I identify the para-
meter b following the identification approach described above. Table V reports mean,
median, and 80% confidence interval, over 1000 simulations, for the six parameters
against the true arbitrary value of the parameters.
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